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THE HELMSLEY CASE:
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONFUSED STATE OF THE LAW
SURROUNDING THE MANIFEST DISREGARD OF LAW
DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO ARBITRATION
David Graff
This Note addresses the Manifest Disregardof Law Doctrine
as applied to arbitralawards.
It is well settled that arbitralawards in manifest disregardof
law will not be confirmed or enforced by a reviewing court. However, since the Supreme Court promulgated this judicial doctrine in
1953, it has failed to provide the lower courts with guidelines or
standardsto consistently apply it. This Note generally addresses the
evolution of the judicially created doctrine in the lower federal and
state courts. Specifically, this Note addresses the confused state of
the law surroundingthe judicial doctrine, details the manifestation of
that confusion in the Helmsley case, and finally, suggests that Supreme Court or legislative intervention is necessary to effect consistent applicationof the doctrine in the lowerfederal and state courts.
Federaland state courts alike have invoked the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine when presented with a challenge to an arbitral award. More often than not, federal and state courts have applied drastically divergent criteria when applying the doctrine; the
result being a mosaic of divergent judicial principles that can euphemistically be termed confounding. This Note describes the drastically divergent standards used by the circuit courts and discusses the
viability of the manifest disregard of evidence as an alternative and
additional ground to vacate an arbitral award. Additionally, this
Note addresses two salient Supreme Court decisions that may indicate the doctrine'sfuture, and illuminate the importance of the judi* B.A.,
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cial doctrine in the modern business community.
After detailing the confusion surroundingthe Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine, and its offspring, the Manifest Disregardof
Evidence Doctrine, this Note describes how that confusion infected
the Helmsley case by detailing the New York State Court of Appeals
disposition regardingseveral points of confusion described in previous sections of this Note.
Lastly, this Note argues that Supreme Court or Legislative intervention is necessary. This Note concludes by suggesting uniform
guidelinesfor federal and state courts to application of the Manifest
DisregardofLaw Doctrine.
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THE HELMSLEY CASE:
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONFUSED STATE OF THE LAW
SURROUNDING THE MANIFEST DISREGARD OF LAW
DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO ARBITRATION

INTRODUCTION

A recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals ended a
decade-long battle over a significant patch of expensive commercial
realty located in the heart of New York City.1 The case was closely
monitored by the press and was even chronicled in an epilogue of a
popular book written about the Empire State Building. 2 The legal
significance of the case, however, is the inconsistent evolution of the
legal standard governing the enforcement of arbitration awards.
While it has been an article of faith among lawmakers and the courts
that arbitration is a favored method of dispute resolution, Wien &
Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear3 illustrates this often articulated public policy (premised upon efficiency and judicial economy) has not
yielded a certain or straightforward path to the enforcement of
awards. As this Note details, after sixty days of trial, the issuance of
a 134-page arbitration award (initially affirmed by a New York intermediate appellate court-applying New York law),4 and, a remand

1 Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. (Helmsley at Court of Appeals), 846
N.E.2d 1201, 1202 n.1 (N.Y. 2006).

2 MITCHELL PACELLE, EMPIRE: A TALE OF OBSESSION, BETRAYAL, AND THE BATTLE FOR

AN AMERICAN ICON 309-14 (2001).

3 Helmsley at Court ofAppeals, 846 N.E.2d 1201.
4 Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. (Helmsley at Appellate Division), 751
N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2002).
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for reconsideration by the United States Supreme Court, 5 that same
state appellate court applied federal arbitration law to vacate the
award.6 Next, that same appellate court stayed its own vacatur and
7
certified the issue to be heard by the New York Court of Appeals,

which applied federal law to enforce the award, thus reversing the
appellate division's vacatur.8
The confusing and protracted procedural posture of the
Helmsley case is hardly surprising in light of the diverse legal landscape governing the enforcement of arbitration awards. Federal and
state courts around the country are sharply divided on several key
components of the standards governing their review of arbitration
awards: (1) whether findings of fact made by arbitrators are reviewable at all and, if so, under what criteria; (2) what legal determinations are subject to review and how that review is to be conducted;
(3) whether a reviewing court may consider the evidentiary record
developed during the arbitral process and, if so, the criteria to be applied and the purpose of such review; and, (4) the significance of arbitral misconduct-such as willfulness and/or defiance associated
with a legal or factual error.
This divergent legal landscape, particularly those issues raised
by the Helmsley case, is rooted in a case decided by the Supreme

5 Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. (Helmsley at the Supreme Court), 540 U.S.

801 (2003).

6 Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. (Helmsley at Appellate Division on Re-

mand), 783 N.Y.S.2d 339, 345-46 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2004).

7 Helmsley at Court of Appeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1206. The certified question asked whether
"the order of [the appellate division], which reversed the judgment of [the] Supreme Court,
[was] properly made?" Id.
' Id. at 12t10.
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Court in 1953, Wilko v. Swan, 9 where the Court, in dicta, indicated
the enforcement of an arbitration award could be challenged if there
was a manifest disregard of law. "[T]he interpretations of the law by
the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the
federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation."' 0 Thus,
since Wilko, in addition to those circumstances specified in the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") (which are generally based on arbitral
misconduct such as corruption, fraud, or other similar improprieties)," the efficacy of an arbitration award has been tested under the
judicially created Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine. 12
The uncertainty associated with the enforcement of arbitration
awards did not emerge merely from the creation of this judicial doctrine. Rather, uncertainty has evolved because the Supreme Court
has not established any standard regarding what constitutes a manifest disregard of law or how the doctrine is to be applied.' 3 Thus, the
lower courts have navigated the boundaries of the doctrine blindly
which has resulted in divergent principles and applications that can
euphemistically be described as confounding. For instance, in the
Seventh Circuit, manifest disregard of law may only be found "when
14
the arbitrator's award actually orders the parties to violate the law."'
9 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-86 (1989).

Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37.
9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a) (West 2007).
12 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37.
13 For example, the Supreme Court has never articulated the appropriate scope or nature of
10

i

judicial review to guide the lower courts in applying the doctrine.
14 Butler Mfg. Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 336 F.3d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 2003)
("[A]n arbitral decision is in manifest disregard of the law only when the arbitrator's award
actually orders the parties to violate the law.") (citing George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany &
Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001)).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss1/7
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In the Second Circuit, however, an award will be vacated if an arbitration panel ignores or refuses to apply a clearly defined and applicable legal principle.15
The prospect of inconsistent standards and application to the
enforcement of arbitration awards should be very troubling to the
business community.

Obviously, the outcome of litigation--even

dispute resolution-should not depend upon the venue or forum.
"Chicago you win, New York you lose" sounds more like a coin flip
than an effective and serious method of resolving a significant commercial dispute. Accordingly, the strong policy favoring arbitration
requires consistency which can only be provided by the Supreme
Court or by legislative intervention.
This Note explores the evolution of the Manifest Disregard of
Law Doctrine and its application in the Helmsley' 6 proceeding. Part I
discusses the genesis of the doctrine since Wilko

7

and the conflicting

application that followed within the circuit courts. Part I also discusses the confusion created by differing standards that have been articulated by the Second Circuit. 18 Part II follows the procedural history of the Helmsley case starting with a lengthy arbitration process
and proceeding through years of complicated appellate practice, including a stop at the United States Supreme Court and ending with a

15 Bear, Steams & Co. v. 1109580 Ontario, Inc., 409 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2005) ("To vacate an arbitration award, a reviewing court must find 'both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a
governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it all together, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.'
(quoting DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1997)).
16 Helmsley at Court ofAppeals, 846 N.E.2d 1201.

Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37.
18 See infra Part I.
'7
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decision from the New York State Court of Appeals.
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9

Significantly,

Part II focuses on how the conflicting standards that have been enunciated and applied to the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine infected Helmsley. Part III concludes that a determination by the Supreme Court of the United States or some additional legislative action
is required in order to further the public policy considerations favoring arbitration.20
I.

THE GENESIS OF THE DOCTRINE

Part I focuses on the evolution of the Manifest Disregard of
Law Doctrine since Wilko and highlights the inconsistent standards
used by the circuit courts in applying the doctrine. Part I also notes
the debate within the Second Circuit concerning the application of the
doctrine, as well as two salient Supyeme Court decisions that arguably provide guidance to lower courts when reviewing arbitration
awards.
The FAA was enacted in 1947 and provides that an arbitration
award may be vacated:
1) where the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4)

'9 See infra Part II.
20 See infra Part III.
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where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.21
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided Wilko 22 and added a
ground upon which a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration
award. While the legal interpretations of arbitrators were not subject
to judicial review, an arbitrator's manifest disregard of law could not
be sanctioned.

The Supreme Court, however, has never explained

the distinction made between a legal error and a manifest disregard of
law. Nor has the Court provided criteria for the application of the
doctrine.

In the absence of requisite guideposts, federal and state

courts have applied the doctrine inconsistently (in over 365 recorded
cases to date), and have scrambled to formulate workable judicial
standards.2 4 As explained by one commentator, "To assert that the
dictum from the Supreme Court's opinion in Wilko v. Swan has...
left the federal circuit courts of appeals in a state of confusion regarding the grounds upon which a commercial arbitration award properly
may be vacated is an understatement.

25

This confusion has been reflected in the divergent decisions
emerging from the circuits.

In the Seventh Circuit, manifest disre-

21 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a).
22 Wilko, 346 U.S. 427.
23 Id. at 436.
24 While the majority of those decisions have been rendered by federal courts, in light of
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence asserting the FAA is coextensive with the Commerce
Clause, the standard's applicability will likely be pervasive under state law in coming years.
See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003).
25 Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray:Judicial Standardsfor Vacatur of Commercial
ArbitrationAwards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731, 774 (1996).
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gard of law may only be found "when the arbitrator's award actually
orders the parties to violate the law.

26

This standard is so strict that

it "all but eliminate[s] its applicability.

27

In the Fifth Circuit, a

manifest disregard of law occurs if (on the basis of the information
available to the court) the arbitrators appreciated the existence of the
law but refused to follow it. 28 Such a refusal will not, however, trigger the non-enforcement doctrine unless it would result in significant
injustice, considering all the circumstances of the case, including the
power of arbitrators to judge norms appropriate to the relations between the parties. 29 The Fourth Circuit has promulgated yet another
standard to be applied to the manifest disregard doctrine. "Courts of
Appeals do not review the reasoning of arbitrators in determining
whether their work draws its essence from the contract, but look only
to the result reached; the single question is whether the award ... is
30
rationally inferable from the contract.,
Currently, the Second Circuit's standard for enforcement of
arbitral awards is similar to the standard adopted by several other circuits. As stated in Wallace v. Buttar, to vacate an arbitration award,
"a reviewing court [must] find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a
governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined,

at 636.
Noah Rubins, "Manifest Disregardof the Law" and Vacatur of Arbitral Awards in the

26 Butler, 336 F.3d
27

United States, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 363, 377 (2001).
28 Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 355 (5th Cir. 2004).
29 Id. (stating that if an award is rationally inferable from the facts before the arbitrator,
the award must be affirmed).
30 Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 193 (4thCir. 1998).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss1/7
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However, unlike the

Seventh Circuit, there is no requirement that a party be ordered to
violate the law,32 and unlike the Fifth Circuit, there is no requirement
of "significant injustice. '33 The standard, likewise, differs from the
"rationally inferable" test applied by the Fourth Circuit. 34
Moreover, even among circuits having similarly stated enforcement standards, enforcement of arbitral awards may vary due to
differing application principles. For instance, the Eighth and Second
Circuits both articulate standards embodying a refusal to apply a legal
principle.35

In the Eighth Circuit, however, such a refusal must be

evidenced by the award itself, "If an arbitrator, for example, stated
the law, acknowledged that he was rendering a decision contrary to
law, and said that he was doing so because he thought the law unfair,
that would be an instance of 'manifest disregard.' ,36 Conversely, in
the Second Circuit, a refusal to apply the law may be proven by extrinsic evidence. 37 For instance, in Hardy v. Walsh Manning Securities LLC, it was shown an arbitrator refused to apply a legal principle
that had been stipulated to by the parties.38
The Second Circuit has likewise qualified, characterized, and
explained the test (generally adding a subjective component) as
31 Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
32

See Butler Mfg. Co., 336 F.3d at 636.

33 See Kergosien, 390 F.3d at 355.
34 See Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc., 142 F.3d at 193.

35 Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Payne, 374 F.3d 672, 674 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Any disregard
must be made clearly to appear and may be found when arbitrators understand and correctly
state the law, but proceed to disregard the same.") (internal citation omitted); Wallace, 378
F.3d at 189 (setting forth the Second Circuit's two-prong standard).
36 Payne, 374 F.3d at 675.
37 Wallace, 378 F.3d at 191.
38 See generally Hardy v. Walsh Manning Securities, LLC, 341 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2003).
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something beyond a mere refusal to apply a legal principle. In Saxis
Steamship Co. v. Multifacs International Traders, Inc.,3 the court
held that vacatur of an arbitration award under the manifest disregard
standard requires "something beyond and different from a mere error
in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law.",40

In Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co.,41 the

Second Circuit held that "[a] party seeking vacatur must therefore
demonstrate that the arbitrator knew of the relevant principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue,
and nonetheless, willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to
apply it."' 42 In Duferco InternationalSteel Trading v. T. Klaveness
Shipping A/S, 43 the Second Circuit-while characterizing the doctrine

as one of last resort--decided that within the Second Circuit, the
courts only review "for a clear demonstration that the panel intentionally defied the law." 44 To add further confusion in the manner
that the standard ought to be applied in Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc.,4
the Second Circuit held:
[E]ven a 'barely colorable' justification for the outcome reached will save an arbitral award. As long as
there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the
governing law, the law is not well-defined, explicit,
and clearly applicable, and an arbitrator cannot be said
to have manifestly disregarded the law in rejecting ei9 375 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1967).
40

Id. at 582 (quoting San Martine Compania de Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd.,

293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961)).
4' 304 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2002).
42 Id. at 217.
4' 333 F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 2003).
44 Id. at 393.
4' 343 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2003).
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In addition to the confusion resulting from different standards
and application principles, there was an internal debate among the
judges in the Second Circuit regarding the deference given to arbitrateors' factual determinations. This debate began in 1998, with the
court's decision in Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.,4 7 where the court

explained the vacatur of an arbitral award. "In view of the strong evidence that Halligan was fired because of his age and the agreement of
the parties that the arbitrators were correctly advised of the applicable
legal principles, we are inclined to hold that they-ignored the law or
the evidence or both., 48 For several years thereafter, the district
courts within the Second Circuit read Halligan as permitting vacatur
of awards if it was shown that an arbitrator ignored the evidence, thus
arbitration awards were routinely challenged as being contrary to the
evidentiary record.49
Finally, eight years later, that judicial review of fact-findings
made by arbitrators ended. In Wallace, the court reversed a vacatur
of an award because "the district court held that an arbitral award
may be . . . vacated on the ground of '[m]anifest disregard of the

46

Id. at 71 (citations omitted).

41 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
48

Id. at 204 (emphasis added).

49 See, e.g., Hakala v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 01 Civ. 3366, 2004 WL 1057788, at *2

(S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2004); Gwynn v. Clubine, 302 F. Supp. 2d 151, 167-68 (W.D.N.Y.
2004); Ono Pharmaceutical Co., v. Cortech, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 5840, 2003 WL 22481379, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2003); Tripi v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Raiola v. Union Bank of Switz., LLC, 230 F. Supp. 2d 355, 358 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); GFI Securities LLC v. Labandeira, No. 01 Civ. 00793, 2002 WL 460059, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); McDaniel v. Bear Steams & Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 343, 351
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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facts' when the award runs contrary to 'strong' evidence favoring the
party bringing the motion to vacate." 5 ° The court explained, "We
note that a number of other district courts in our Circuit, directly relying on Halligan or on district court authority purporting to rely on
that case, have asserted the same principle.

Such reliance is mis-

taken.",5' Reinforcing this point, the court observed, "In Westerbeke
we explicitly characterized Halligan's suggestion that arbitral awards
may be vacated on the ground of manifest disregard of evidence as
dicta.

52

As detailed more fully below, this confusion impacted the
Helmsley case. 53 Initially, the appellate court in Helmsley (the Appellate Division, First Department) 54 relied upon the Second Circuit's articulation of the rule-manifest disregard of evidence-when reviewing arbitral awards under the manifest disregard standard.5 5 Thus,
just as in many federal cases that mistakenly followed Halligan, the
lower appellate court in Helmsley also reviewed the facts and evidence.

6

As discussed below, such review was the principle reason

for reversal by the New York Court of Appeals.57
The record that proceeded to the New York Court of Appeals

50 Wallace, 378 F.3d at 191 (quoting Wallace v. Buttar, 239 F. Supp. 2d

388, 392

(S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
51 Id. at 191-92 (internal citations omitted).
52

Id. at 192.

53 Helmsley at Court ofAppeals, 846 N.E.2d 1201.
54 See generally Helmsley at Appellate Division on Remand, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 344-45.

55 Wallace, 378 F.3d at 191-92.
56 Helmsley at Appellate Division on Remand, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 344 ("[The arbitrators]
ignored the facts that Helmsley-Spear, Inc. had different officers, directors, shareholders,
management personnel, financial structure and fewer properties under management than
Helmsley-Spear.").
57 Helmsley at Court ofAppeals, 846 N.E.2d 1201.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss1/7

14

2008]

Graff: The Helmsley Case: An Illustration of the Confused State of the

MANIFEST DISREGARD OF LAW DOCTRINE

133

was certainly complex. The court's task was further complicated be-

cause, under its own jurisprudence, if the Supreme Court has not
ruled, and the federal appellate courts are divided upon a legal principle, the New York Court of Appeals is not bound to follow the Sec8
ond Circuit's view of federal law, nor that of any other Circuit.1

Hence, it fell to the New York Court of Appeals to develop an appro-

priate standard and application of principles governing the Manifest
Disregard of Law Doctrine as to be applied by New York State
courts.5 9

Finally, adding to this very complicated legal landscape, there
are two important Supreme Court cases that impacted Helmsley.
While neither of the cases focused directly on the Manifest Disregard
of Law Doctrine, both influenced the outcome of Helmsley. In
60
United Paper Workers International Union v. Misco, Inc., the Su-

preme Court held, "Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it
is the arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract
that they have agreed to accept.",6' Although Misco related to a collective bargaining dispute (which mandates arbitration in a majority
58 Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 495 N.E.2d 345, 348 (N.Y. 1986).
When there is neither decision of the Supreme Court nor uniformity
in the decisions of the lower Federal courts, however, a State court required to interpret the Federal statute ... is not precluded from exercising its own judgment or bound to follow the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals within the territorial boundaries of which it sits.
Id.
59 The FAA is not an independent basis of federal jurisdiction, so it will not be uncommon
for state courts to be the interpreters of the FAA and/or the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine. Indeed, in the absence of diversity jurisdiction state courts would be the only forum
for an aggrieved party to challenge an arbitration award.
60 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
61 Id. at 37-38.
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of labor relation cases), it was urged by the petitioners that there was
no principled distinction between fact finding made by collective
bargaining arbitrators and a panel operating under the FAA. 62 Petitioners argued that there is no distinction because arbitral findings of
facts are not reviewable, and when parties enter into an agreement to
arbitrate it is the fact-findings of the arbitration panel that count, not
those of a reviewing court. 6 3 As discussed below, the Court of Appeals appears to have credited this argument.
Citizen Bank v. Alafabco Inc.64 is the other salient Supreme
Court decision. The Court held that the reach of the FAA is coextensive with that of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and applies to disputes that merely "affect commerce" rather
than only those "in commerce.

65

Thus, the statutory provisions of

the FAA along with the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine will be
applied to the vast majority of commercial arbitration awards. Nearly
all business "affects commerce."
II.

THE CASE

Part 1I reviews the background of the case and includes a description of the factual and legal findings made by the arbitration
panel (including former United States Attorney General Nicolas
Katzenbach) and the protracted appellate challenge to the arbitration
award-particularly highlighting the New York Court of Appeals de62 Helmsley at the Court ofAppeals, 846 N.E.2d 1201.
63 id.

64 539 U.S. 52.
65 Id. at 56 ("We have interpreted the term involving commerce in the FAA as the func").
tional equivalent of the more familiar term affecting commerce ....
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cision.

A.

Helmsley Publicized: An Introduction

It started in 1997. The New York Times headline proclaimed,
"Helmsley Turns Over Control of Company." 66 The newspaper continued, "Leona Helmsley has turned over control of Helmsley-Spear
Inc., one of the city's largest real estate management companies, to
her late husband Harry Helmsley's two closest business associates,
ending a bitter three-year feud that had hampered her ability to sell
off a $5 billion real estate empire." 67 The story also noted the commencement of litigation involving Mrs. Helmsley and billionaire
business associates Irving Schneider and Alvin Schwartz. "Although
Mrs. Helmsley has ended her battling on one front, she remains
locked in combat with another of Mr. Helmsley's former business associates, Peter Malkin, a wealthy landlord who owns many buildings
in partnership with the Helmsley estate and with Mr. Schneider and
Mr. Schwartz., 68 The press continued to follow the litigation. Three
years later, an article in The Wall Street Journal,headlined, "Inside
the Bitter Battle for Helmsley Buildings", described the "court battle
[as] part of the final chapter of a great Helmsley saga that has riveted
New York for decades.,

69

Finally, or so it seemed, the battle was over. Under the banner headline, "Helmsley-Spear Retains Control of Empire State
66 Charles V. Bagli, Helmsley Turns Over Control of Company, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
1997, at B7.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69

Peter Grant, Inside the Bitter Battle For Helmsley Buildings: Role of ManagingAgent

Becomes Center of Fight That's Draggedfor Years,

WALL ST.
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Building," the New York Times reported in April of 2001:
An arbitration panel ruled on March 30 that
Mr. Malkin could not remove Mr. Schneider or
Helmsley-Spear as the managing agent of the properties. Mr. Malkin's law firm had accused HelmsleySpear of mismanagement, but after four years, 1,000
exhibits and 50 witnesses, it failed to persuade the arbitrators of any wrongdoing.
In its decision, which was filed on Friday, the
panel said it found "credible proof' that Wien & Malkin "breached numerous ethical obligations" in its supervision of the properties, as Helmsley-Spear had asserted. The arbitrators said Wien & Malkin must
disclose its actions to its partners, if it tries to terminate Helmsley-Spear in the future.7 °
The case, however, was nowhere near a conclusion. Instead,
the litigation continued for another five years, the sole issue being the
efficacy of this ruling by the arbitration panel issued on March 31,
2001. Before the media frenzy over Helmsley, the case erupted from
relatively ordinary beginnings.
B.

The Arbitration Award

The 134-page Award ("Award") 71 begins by describing the
partnership forged by two of the most prominent players of the New
York City real estate scene in the twentieth century. Lawrence Wien,
the founder of a law firm known as Wien & Malkin, was credited as
70 Charles V. Bagli, Helmsley-Spear Retains Control of Empire State Building, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 10, 2001, at B7.
71 In re Arbitration between Wien & Malkin, LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., American Arbitration Association Case Nos. 13 180 00976 97 & 13 180 00964 97 (Mar. 30, 2001) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Award].
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the creator of modem real estate syndications-investment vehicles
using partnership entities and multiple layers of leaseholds to allocate
the risk and reward, including the tax advantages of owning real estate among "participants.

'2

In the late 1940s, Mr. Wien joined

forces with Harry Helmsley, a well known real estate venture capitalist. Wien and Helmsley divided responsibility for the properties they
syndicated; Wien made money "by investing but also by syndicating
73
shares and then managing the legal aspects of the syndication"
while Helmsley "made his money both by taking a piece of the property as an investment and equally importantly by acting as managing
74
agent and earning commissions on the rentals.
The press reported much of the Award focused upon the efforts of Peter Malkin (Wien's son-in-law) and Wien & Malkin (the
law firm Mr. Wien had founded) to oust Helmsley-Spear as managing agent for eleven of the syndicated properties because of alleged
improprieties and mismanagement and to terminate Helmsley-Spear
"for cause." 75 The Award details the virtual mountain of proof adduced by Wien & Malkin in support of its multiple claims of mismanagement and impropriety.

6

Wien & Malkin's case failed. The

panel was critical of the expert testimony proffered and also suspi-

Id. at 1-2. For instance, the Empire State Building is managed by an "operating partnership" that leases the building (and shares the profit) with another partnership; that partnership in turn leases the building (and shares profit) with another entity pursuant to ground
lease. Each of these partnerships provides investment opportunities for multiple investors
("participants") that purchased interests, allowing them to enjoy the benefits of ownership of
the world's most prestigious building.
" Id. at 2.
74 Id. (emphasis omitted).
71 Id. at 3, 109.
76 See Award, supra note 71.
72
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cious of other evidence supporting the claims of mismanagement, including documents such as business records. The panel explained its
overall impressions.
Prior to late 1996-early 1997, the relationship
between Wien & Malkin and Helmsley-Spear appears
to have been at least cordial. At some point in the late
1996 time frame, however, Wien & Malkin apparently
decided to embark on a massive effort to terminate
Helmsley-Spear as managing agent, culminating in
this arbitration. We found that starting in late 1996,
virtually everything Wien & Malkin said, wrote and
did was primarily intended to strengthen its litigation
position in its dispute with Helmsley-Spear.77
None of the panel's adverse determinations regarding mismanagement and impropriety were ever challenged by Wien & Malkin, nor were the panel's "for cause" determinations against Wien &
Malkin subject to appellate review. 8 Accordingly, this Note does not
describe Wien & Malkin's remarkable claims of bid rigging, belowmarket renting, bribery, or the other claims of operational deficiencies and incompetence.79 Instead, this Note focuses solely on Wien
& Malkin's arguments challenging the Award: (1) the determination
that Helmsley-Spear enjoys the status of successor in interest-it was
not a legal imposter as contended by Wien & Malkin; 80 (2) that
Helmsley-Spear had not been properly removed (in some cases by a
vote of virtually all the investors involved in a building) as managing

7 Id. at 14.
78 Helmsley at Appellate Division, 751 N.Y.S.2d 21.

79 See Award, supra note 71.
'o Id. at 117-18.
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agent of the buildings; 81 and (3) the panel's validity determination regarding Leona Helmsley's voting agreement executed as part of her
settlement with Messrs. Schwartz and Schneider. 82 These three issues were sometimes referred to collectively by the arbitration panel
and the reviewing courts as Wien & Malkin's "without cause" case.
1.

The ArbitratorsFound that Helmsley-Spear
was a Valid Successor in Interest-Not a
Legal Imposter

As noted above, in 1997, Mrs. Helmsley settled a wellpublicized three-year battle with her husband's former associates,
Messrs. Schwartz and Schneider. One subject of that litigation was
the enforcement of an option agreement under which Messrs.
Schwartz and Schneider were given the right to acquire Mr.
Helmsley's interest (the stock of the corporate entity) in HelmsleySpear, Inc. 83 As part of the settlement of this three-year litigation, the
stock option was recast as a sale of all the assets of HelmsleySpear-including an assignment of one critical asset-the right to
serve as managing agent of the properties. 84
Wien & Malkin argued that the assignment of management
rights was unlawful, that such rights (whether under management
8! Id. at 111-17.
82 Id. at 119-24.

83 Award, supra note 71, at 118. The option agreement stated:
[t]his agreement shall be binding upon the heirs and legal representatives
of the individual parties and upon the successors and assigns of
HELMSLEY ENTERPRISES, INC. and HELMSLEY-SPEAR, INC.
The rights of SCHWARTZ and SCHNEIDER hereunder are personal to
each of them and to the survivor of them, and are not transferable by
both or either by operation of law or otherwise.
Id.
8

SeeAward, supranote 71, at 118.
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agreements or part of formative partnership agreements) were in the
nature of a personal service agreement requiring consent of the Partnerships that owned and/or controlled the properties. 85 Since no such
consent was sought or given, Wien & Malkin contended the entity in
the arbitration (formerly Newco) was a legal imposter. 86 As such,
Newco had no claim to manage the eleven commercial properties in
dispute.87
The arbitrators rejected Wien & Malkin's argument explaining:
This analysis must start with our conclusion
that Newco, renamed Helmsley-Spear, Incorporated,
the Respondent in this case is the valid successor in interest of Helmsley-Spear, Incorporated. It achieves
that status by virtue of an option agreement of 1970.

The parties to the 1997 transaction cast it as a purchase of the assets of the existing Helmsley-Spear
corporation rather than a purchase of its stock. We are
persuaded this change was merely one of form, done
for tax reasons having to do with certain "parked"
properties that are unrelated to the issues in this case.
Claimants have not persuaded us that the change of
form had any other consequence to the parties, to the
partnerships or to Wien & Malkin. We find that the
change of form is not a breach of any duty HelmsleySpear owed to the partnerships and that Claimants' efforts to elevate this technical matter to a nullification
88
of Helmsley-Spear's rights are without merit.

85 Id.
86
87

88

Id.
Id.
Id. at 117-18.
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The Voting Agreement

As part of the 1997 settlement with Messrs. Schwartz and
Schneider, Mrs. Helmsley entered into a voting agreement. 89 This
agreement was designed to ensure Helmsley-Spear would continue to
manage several of the disputed buildings and required that Mrs.
Helmsley take all action within her power (including casting partnership votes) to ensure that Newco-now Helmsley-Spear--continued
as managing agent. 90 Wien & Malkin argued the voting agreement
was in violation of New York Partnership Law Section 53(1),91 which
permits a partner to transfer only his economic interest, not management rights.9 2 Wien & Malkin continued to argue the agreement also
violated section 40(7) of New York Partnership Law which provides:
"No person can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the partners.

93

The panel disagreed and stated, "[t]he op-

tion agreement is of long standing, and plainly contemplated that Mr.
Schneider and Mr. Schwartz would continue the Helmsley management of Helmsley-Spear.

Mrs. Helmsley, as successor to Harry

Helmsley, is merely carrying out that intention.,
3.

94

The Votes Invalidated

The arbitration panel did recognize that Helmsley-Spear could
be terminated if the requisite interests of the partnership owning the

89 Award, supra note 71, at 119.
90 Id.

91 N.Y. P'SHIP LAW § 53(1) (McKinney 2006).
92 See Award, supra note 71, at 120.
93 N.Y. P'sHIP LAW § 40(7) (McKinney 2006).

94 Award, supra note 71, at 120.
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properties (usually specified in the formative partnership agreements)
decided to do so (a proxy vote was also found to be permissible).95
The panel, however, determined that such a decision by the partnership must be informed and the result of a fair process.9 6 For instance,
according to the panel, the replacement of Helmsley-Spear as managing agent would have been justified if the partnership believed a different managing agent could produce better results.97
The panel proceeded to find that the purported votes (and
there was a significant issue about whether any vote was taken) terminating Helmsley-Spear were invalid.98 Finding multiple flaws in
the process, including the use of a blind, uninformed proxy as well as
serious deficiencies in what was disclosed to partners and what was
hidden from them, the panel essentially disqualified Mr. Malkin as a
proxy solicitor.99 The panel likewise invalidated all purported votes
that were conducted by Wien & Malkin in its effort to terminate
Helmsley-Spear as managing agent.'00
The panel found Mr. Malkin's request to get the discretion to
vote his partner's interest without disclosing the complete details "of
how and to what extent he and his entities would benefit from the
removal of Helmsley-Spear, as well as any interest he or his entities
might have in some future managing agent" to be a breach of Mr.

9' Id. at 110.
96 Id. at 113.
9' Id. at 115.
98 Id. at 131.

99 Award, supra note 71, at 112-15.
1oo Id. at 115 ("[W]e are nullifying the Malkin Proxies for these reasons and voiding any
vote or purported vote in which they were used or might be used in the future .... ").
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The panel also found that

Helmsley-Spear presented credible proof of numerous ethical violations relating to the solicitation of proxies and the voting process and
concluded, "those who seek proxies assume the highest fiduciary obligations to those they solicit, and must provide complete and accurate information on the matters solicited."' 0 2 Given the factual determinations, it was evident that neither Mr. Malkin nor Wien &
0
Malkin satisfied these ethical obligations. The votes did not stand.'

4.

3

Arbitration Summarized

The panel denied the claims of Wien & Malkin and Peter
Malkin to remove Helmsley-Spear, Inc. as managing agent for cause
in the subject properties. 10

4

Likewise, Wien & Malkin's claims to

remove Helmsley-Spear without cause were denied. 0 5 Incidental to
that holding, the panel determined proxies solicited by Wien & Malkin (permitting a vote to remove Helmsley-Spear) were "null, void
and [the] votes" against Helmsley-Spear as managing agent for any
of the properties were, likewise, voided by the panel. 0 6 The panel
also held that Helmsley-Spear was not a legal imposter but instead
that it legitimately succeeded to the rights to manage the eleven properties.' °7 Further, the panel enjoined Wien & Malkin from "contesting the validity or in any way interfering with the Voting Agreement
101

Id. at 115.

102

Id. at 113.
at 117.

103 Id.

104 Award, supra note 71, at 131.

105 Id.
106 Id.
107

Id.at 131.
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between Leona Helmsley and Helmsley-Spear" (Wien & Malkin
must give full force and effect to that agreement in any future vote to
remove Helmsley-Spear as managing agent). 0 8 Finally, the panel
found Wien & Malkin had engaged in ethical impropriety serious
enough to require all future votes and partnership governance be judicially monitored.' 0 9
Litigation on these issues persisted until 2006 when the case
was finally settled.
C.

The Court Challenge
1.

New York Courts and New York Law

After the panel's determination that the evidence did not support grounds for termination of Helmsley-Spear as managing agent
for the partnerships, Wien & Malkin moved to vacate the decision on
the theory that it was "legally in error."' 10 The New York Supreme
Court disagreed and confirmed the award on July 23, 2001.111 On
appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, ruled that because
the buildings were located in New York City, the dispute did not
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the FAA did not apply.12 Italso affirmed the supreme court's confirmation, stating,
"the award must stand unless shown to be utterly arbitrary or viola-

108

Id.

109 Award, supra note 71, at 132.
110 Helmsley at Court of Appeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1204.

111 The decision of the New York Supreme Court granting Helmsley-Spear's motion to
confirm the Award is unpublished.
112Helmsley at Appellate Division, 751 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
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tive of public policy."

13

145

The court stated, "We are not empowered to

vacate an award merely for errors of law or fact committed by the arbitrators . . .we conclude that the arbitration panel's findings ...
were not so arbitrary as to warrant vacatur." ' 1 4 The New York Court
of Appeals denied plaintiff s motion for leave to appeal.' 15
2.

United States Supreme Court Remand

After exhausting its state court appeals, Wien & Malkin filed
a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court on July
21, 2006.116 While the petition was pending, the Court decided Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,117 holding that the FAA is coextensive
with the Commerce Clause in that it applies to activities that merely
affect commerce (as opposed to activities actively in the stream of
commerce).

18

In light of Alafabco, the Supreme Court remanded

Helmsley (in a one sentence decision) with instruction to reconsider
the determination that the FAA did not apply to the enforcement of
the award." 9
Alafabco has profound implications for the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine. Since nearly all activities affect commerce,
the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine will be the standard for review in the vast majority of challenges to commercial arbitration
113 Id. (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511 (McKinney 2008)).
114

Helmsley at Appellate Division, 751 N.Y.S.2d at 22.

115 Wien & Malkin, LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 790 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 2003).
116

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., No. 06-

98, (U.S. 2006). The Supreme Court denied the petition. Wien & Malkin LLP v. HelmsleySpear, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 34 (2006).
"1 539 U.S. 52 (2003).
'1 Id.at 56.
119 Helmsley at the Supreme Court, 540 U.S. 801.
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awards-both in federal and state courts. Given this commercial reality, it is essential that the standard for arbitral review be consistent
in order to encourage businesspeople to arbitrate.
3.

New York Courts and FederalLaw

On remand, the First Department determined that in light of
Alafabco, 120 the FAA applied to Helmsley. 121 Accordingly, the court
proceeded to apply the manifest disregard standard to the issues
raised by Wien & Malkin.122 First, the court held that the arbitrators
exhibited a manifest disregard of law in determining that HelmsleySpear had obtained the status as a legal successor. 123 Instead, the
court made its own factual determinations: (1) the new HelmsleySpear was more than a mere "change in form" and (2) the panel "ignored the fact that Helmsley-Spear, Inc. had different officers, directors, shareholders, management personnel, financial structure and
fewer properties under management than Helmsley-Spear."' 124 The
court then characterized the transaction between Mrs. Helmsley and
Messrs. Schneider and Schwartz as an assignment and proceeded to
address an argument that was not reached by the panel: whether the
assignment of the personal service contract to Helmsley-Spear (formerly Newco) was valid.1 25 The court, applying what it described as
well-settled law, voided the assignment of the management agree-

120
121

539 U.S. at 56.
Helmsley at Appellate Division on Remand, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 341.

122 Id.
123

Id. at 344.

124Id.
125 Id.
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126
ments (personal service contracts) to Helmsley-Spear.

The First Department also found that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the partnership agreements in its finding that the
vote to terminate Helmsley-Spear was not sufficiently informed or
127
misinformed, and thereby void.
Contrary to the findings of the arbitration panel, the
partnership agreements did not provide for a particular
method of solicitation of proxies for a vote to terminate the managing agents and did not establish a fiduciary duty to them. Nor was there any showing that
induced the partners to give
Peter Malkin fraudulently
128
proxies.
their
him
Finally, the court upheld the arbitration determination that
Leona Helmsley's voting agreement with Schwartz and Schneider
was valid for the reasons cited by the panel. 129 Next, evidently recognizing the peculiar nature of its decision (vacating an award under
federal law that was previously confirmed under state law), the First
Department granted Helmsley-Spear leave to appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals. The following question was certified: "Was the
order of this Court, which reversed the judgment of the Supreme
' 30
Court, properly made?"'
4.

The Court of Appeals: The Last Chapter

On February 21, 2006, the New York Court of Appeals issued
126 Helmsley at Appellate Division on Remand, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 344-45.
127 Id.
128

Id. at 345.

129

Id.

130

Helmsley at Court of Appeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1206.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

29

Touro Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 [2014], Art. 7

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 24

the final decision on the Helmsley case. 13 1 That decision reversed the
32
vacatur issued by the appellate division and confirmed the award.
In so doing, the court established the standard for applying the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine in all New York State courts.
While not required to do so under its own jurisprudence, the
New York Court of Appeals generally adopted the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine.13 3

The

court echoed the Second Circuit's admonition that the doctrine of
manifest disregard is a "severely limited doctrine, ' ' 14 that it is a "doctrine of last resort," 135 and is to be used only upon a rare occurrence
of apparent "egregious impropriety" ' 136 on the part of the arbitrator
where none of the statutory provisions of the FAA apply. The New
York Court of Appeals also adopted the Second Circuit's two-prong
articulation of the Doctrine of Manifest Disregard:
To modify or vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, a court must find both that
(1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle
yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2)
defined,
the law ignored by the arbitrators was well
1 37
explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.
'3'

Id. at 1201.

132

Id. at 1206.

133 See Flanagan,495 N.E.2d at 348.
When there is neither decision of the Supreme Court nor uniformity
in the decisions of the lower Federal courts, however, a State court required to interpret the Federal statute ... is not precluded from exercising its own judgment or bound to follow the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals within the territorial boundaries of which it sits.

Id.
134 Helmsley at Court of Appeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1206.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 1207 (citing Wallace, 378 F.3d at 189).
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While relying principally on the Second Circuit, the court referenced Supreme Court authority as well as its own jurisprudence.
The court opened its opinion by citing the Supreme Court's holding
13 for the
in United PaperworkersInternational Union v. Misco Inc."

proposition that it is the arbitrator's findings of fact and contractual
language that control, not the appellate court's interpretation of a factual record or contractual term. 139 The New York Court of Appeals
also cited its own jurisprudence for the principle that "an arbitrator's
award should not be vacated for errors of law and fact committed by
the arbitrator and the courts should not assume the role of overseers
to mold the award to conform to their sense of justice.,

140

Also, "[a]

court cannot examine the merits of an arbitration award and substitute
its judgment for that of the arbitrator simply because it believes its interpretation would be the better one.'

14 1

Applying these standards was a relatively easy task. Not only
has the Appellate Division expressly rejected the fact determinations
made by the panel, but it had also substituted its own judgment for
that of the arbitrators.

This was particularly evident with regard to

the transaction by which Helmsley-Spear achieved successor status.
The Appellate Division rejected the panel's determination that
Messrs. Schwartz and Schneider had exercised the option allowing

"' 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
139 Helmsley at Court ofAppeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1206 (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 37-38).
140 Helmsley at Court of Appeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1206 (citing In re Sprinzen, 389 N.E.2d
456, 458 (N.Y. 1979)).
141 Helmsley at Court of Appeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1206 (citing New York State Corr. Officers & Police Benev. Ass'n, Inc. v. State, 726 N.E.2d 462, 465 (N.Y. 1999)).
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them to acquire Helmsley-Spear; for example, the Appellate Division
found the Option Agreement was cancelled. The Court of Appeals
resolved this factual debate about the option in favor of the arbitral
panel. "Whether the ...

option agreement was exercised was a fac-

tual determination by the panel and its findings should remain undisturbed."'' 42 The Court of Appeals also noted the Appellate Division's
broader analysis of the transaction by which Helmsley-Spear acquired successor status (as found by the arbitral panel). The Appellate Division stated that the panel "erroneously conclud[ed] that
Helmsley-Spear[] was a mere change ofform" and "ignored the facts
that Helmsley-Spear[] had different officers, directors, shareholders,
management personnel, financial structure and fewer properties under
management than [the former] Helmsley-Spear."' 143 Citing Second
146
Circuit authority, 144 Misco, 145 and its own decision in Dowleyne,
the Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division's analysis of
the transaction-second-guessing

the arbitrators--constituted

re-

versible error. 147 "In this regard, the Appellate Division improperly
disturbed the panel's finding that the change in form was not consequential.'

48

142Helmsley at Court ofAppeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1208.
143Helmsley at the Appellate Division on Remand, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 344 (emphasis added).
144See Wallace, 378 F.3d at 192-93 (holding that manifest disregard of evidence is never
an appropriate ground for vacatur in the Second Circuit).
145 484 U.S. at 38 ("But as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying
the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.").
146Dowleyne v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 816 N.E.2d 191 (N.Y. 2004) (reversing the appellate division vacatur of an arbitration award "because it improperly substituted its factual
finding for that of a majority of the arbitration panel.").
147Helmsley at Court ofAppeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1209.
148Id.
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The Court of Appeals was also critical of the Appellate Division's review of the legal determination (one not even reached by the
panel) concerning the assignment of management rights. "Even if the
law of assignment of personal services contracts was clearly applicable, there was no showing that the arbitrators knew they were disregarding the law by naming Helmsley-Spear a valid successor in interest." 149

Here, the Court of Appeals focused upon the subjective

component of the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine. "Nor is there
any deliberateness or willfulness [found either within the award or inferred from a determination that was not barely colorable] exhibited
1 50
within the award that shows the arbitrators' intent to flout the law."
In the absence of proof of such willfulness, the Court of Appeals held
the panel's legal determinations could not be disturbed. 5 '
Next, the Court of Appeals turned to the panel's voiding of
several votes taken to terminate Helmsley-Spear as managing agent.
The panel required that such votes be informed (even if conducted by
proxy); the Appellate Division disagreed and held to the contrary.
Just as the Appellate Division's ruling regarding Helmsley-Spear's
status as a successor was overturned, the Appellate Court's ruling regarding the voting agreement was also reversed.'1 2

The standard

(borrowed from the Second Circuit) applied, however, was somewhat
different. While fact determinations are not subject to review under
the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine, a "manifest disregard of a

149 Id.
15o Id.
151 Id.

152 Helmsley at Court of Appeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1210.
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contract is appropriate only where the arbitral award contradicts an
express and unambiguous term of the contract or if the award so far
departs from the terms of the agreement that it is not even arguably
derived from the contract."' 53 Applying the standard, the court held
that there was no such deviation from any express or ambiguous term
54
of the governing contracts, reversing the Appellate Division.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the First Department
did not err in determining that the voting agreement between Mrs.
Helmsley, Schneider, and Schwartz was valid. 155 The panel determined the voting agreement did not transfer Leona Helmsley's partnership interest, which would be prohibited by New York Partnership
Law, 156 but merely acted as an agreement that Helmsley would vote
for Helmsley-Spear, Inc. as managing agent.1 57

Because Mrs.

Helmsley was well within her rights to cast a vote in any manner she
pleased, with or absent agreement, she thus did not act in contravention of New York State Partnership Law, and the Arbitration Panel
did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Voting Agreement did
not violate any settled law.158

53 Id. at 1210 (citing Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 222 (2d

Cir. 2002)).
154 Helmsley at Court of Appeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1210.
155

id.
156 N.Y. P'SHIP LAW § 53(1) (stating that while a partner may transfer his economic interest, he may not transfer his management rights).
157Helmsley at Court of Appeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1210.
158Id. ("Leona Helmsley's agreement involved a vote she was entitled to cast in whatever
manner she chose. Therefore, we agree with the lower court's reasoning that the arbitrators
did not manifestly disregard the law by concluding Mrs. Helmsley's actions did not violate
state partnership law.").
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THE FUTURE OF THE DOCTRINE

Part III summarizes the confusion within the circuit courts regarding the application of the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine,
the appropriate scope of appellate review of a panel's factual determinations, if any, and if and when manifest disregard of contract is an
appropriate ground for vacatur of an award. Part III urges the Supreme Court and/or legislature to take an active role in providing
consistent standards by which federal and state courts can apply the
doctrine.

Finally, Part III recommends a resolution to the unan-

swered questions emerging in wake of Wilko and the policy considerations underpinning the recommended standard.
The most glaring fact to emerge from the case law following
Wilko is the inconsistency in the standards and criterion that have
been enunciated by the federal circuit courts in applying the Manifest
Disregard of Law Doctrine.

After Alafabco, this is true for state

courts as well. The Seventh Circuit has articulated a test that requires
the arbitrator to order the parties to the arbitration to violate the
law,

59

a standard so stringent that it is not, in any way, a significant

addition to the preexisting FAA statutory framework that encompasses such egregious misconduct.

60

The Fifth Circuit requires that

the arbitrators appreciated the applicable legal standard, but failed to
apply it, and even when such disregard of the law is present, the
award will not be vacated unless it would result in a significant injus-

159 Butler, 336 F.3d at 636.
'60

See 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a) (West 2007).
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tice. 16 The Fourth Circuit standard, by contrast, prohibits a review of
the arbitrator's reasoning. Thus, vacating if the arbitral disposition is
not "rationally inferable from the contract."'

62

The Second Circuit's

standard differs in that it does not require a violation of law (like the
Seventh Circuit); it does not require significant injustice (like the
Fifth Circuit); and, finally, it does not use a "rationally inferable" test
163
(like the Fourth Circuit).
There are additional unsettled questions that compound the
confusion drawn from these inconsistent standards. Does the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine apply to arbitral fact finding as well
as legal determinations? May an arbitral award be vacated if a panel
disregards a contract? The Second Circuit has changed positions on
these issues. In Halligan,the court applied the Manifest Disregard of
Law Doctrine to both facts and evidence.

64

Predictably, lower courts

followed the appellate court's lead and vacated many awards based
upon a determination that arbitrators disregarded evidence presented
by the parties. 165 Indeed, this is just what the appellate division did in
the Helmsley case---citing its own jurisprudence that followed Halligan into the thicket of fact review. All this changed as a result of
Wallace, where the Second Circuit disowned Halligan, and stated
161 Kergosien, 390 F.3d at 355.
162

Apex, 142 F.3d at 193.

163 Wallace, 378 F.3d at 189 (stating that to vacate an arbitration award, a reviewing court
must find both that "(1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined,
explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.") (citing Banco, 344 F.3d at 263).
'64Halligan, 148 F.3d at 204 ("In view of the strong evidence that Halligan was fired because of his age and the agreement of the parties that the arbitrators were correctly advised
of the applicable legal principles, we are inclined to hold that they ignored the law or the
evidence or both.").
165See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
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that the passage from Halligan allowing for fact review was mere
dicta. 166 The Second Circuit then proceeded to admonish the lower
67
courts because arbitral fact review was not permissible.1

The New York Court of Appeals has made one thing clear:
arbitral fact-findings are not reviewable-at least in New York State.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals' reliance upon Misco suggests that
this rule may have broader application.168 Nevertheless, even in light
of this clear prohibition of fact review, the New York Court of Appeals carved out another basis upon which disappointed litigants may
challenge arbitration awards. "[V]acatur on the basis of manifest disregard of a contract is appropriate only where the arbitral award contradicts an express and unambiguous term of the contract or if the
award so far departs from the terms of the agreement that it is not
even arguably derived from the contract."' 169 The distinction between
contract and fact review is difficult to understand, and not surprisingly, with the exception of the Second Circuit, there is no such distinction made by circuit courts.

166

Wallace, 378 F.3d at 192.

161Id. at 193 (holding that a manifest disregard of evidence by the panel is never an appropriate ground for vacatur of an arbitration award).
168 Helmsley at Court of Appeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1206 (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 37-38).

The New York Court of Appeals' reliance on Misco indicates that the court accepted the argument that there was no principle distinction between the contract labor dispute in Misco
and a commercial dispute arising under the FAA. Thus, Misco may be controlling and preclude review of a panel's evidentiary findings in all disputes arising under the FAA. Currently, Misco remains persuasive authority on the issue.
169 Helmsley at the Court of Appeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1210 (citing Westetbeke, 304 F.3d at

222).
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The Efficacy of Arbitral Awards: The Future of
the Doctrine

Given the confusion that has emerged after Wilko, the Supreme Court's voice is necessary to provide clear, uniform guideposts
for the lower courts to apply when considering vacatur under the doctrine of manifest disregard. The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a case presenting these issues at the earliest possible time.
"[The] principal purpose for which [the United States Supreme
Court] use[s its] certiorari jurisdiction . . . is to resolve conflicts

among the United States courts of appeals and state courts concerning
the meaning of provisions of federal law."'

70

Alternatively, if the

Supreme Court does not act, it is certainly feasible for Congress to do
so.

Particularly, the FAA could be amended to provide express
standards to be applied in adjudicating whether there has been a
manifest disregard of law.

In either case, the manifest disregard

standard should incorporate the following criteria:
0

There should be no review of a panel's factual determinations. The Misco case ought to be applied inasmuch as there is no principle distinction between a
collective bargaining case such as Misco and a case
arising under the FAA. The policy considerations underpinning a preclusion of fact review in labor dispute
arbitrations, such as certainty, efficiency, and finality,
are equally applicable to disputes arising under the

170

Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991) (citing SuP. CT. R. 10(a)).
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FAA.
" The arbitrator's determinations, with regard to contractual determinations, should likewise be binding
and non-reviewable. There is no principled distinction
between a factual determination and contract interpretation.
*

The basic standard should be that which has been articulated by the Second Circuit (and followed by several other circuits) and adopted by the New York
Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit standard is too
rigorous inasmuch as it writes the doctrine out of the
law, and the Fourth Circuit is too lenient in permitting
fact review. The Second Circuit standard is that an
award will be vacated if an arbitration panel ignores or
refuses to apply a clearly defined and applicable legal
principle.

*

In addition to satisfying the Second Circuit standard,
borrowing the "significant injustice" requirement from
the Fifth Circuit will help ensure finality and certainty
of arbitration awards.

The significant injustice re-

quirement will permit vacatur pursuant to the recommended standard only if, the Second Circuit standard
is met first, and, second, the award would result in
significant injustice to one or both of the parties. Even
if an arbitrator knowingly disregards a well-settled
principle, the award will still be upheld if no great in-
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justice is suffered by the parties to the arbitration.
These criteria best satisfy the policies underlying arbitration-finality, efficiency, and certainty-while still maintaining the
efficacy of the legal process.
B.

Policy Considerations

Two policy consideration underpinning the recommendation
that an arbitral determination be subject to such a limited review.
First, members of the business community generally agree to arbitrate
a dispute because the process offers an efficient, final, and private
resolution. Arbitration is usually streamlined. Discovery is significantly curtailed, hearings are scheduled without regard to distractions
that often preoccupy judges, and a comprehensive appellate process
is eliminated (or reduced). The recommended standard-integrating
the Second and Fifth Circuit standards-is designed to provide a certain result to this efficient process. Certainly, the Second Circuit
standard is an appropriate basic framework to ensure certainty, efficiency, and finality to arbitral awards. Empirical evidence illustrates
that the standard adopted by the Second Circuit disturbs only the
" ' As noted in Wallace, the
most egregiously wrong results.17
Second

Circuit has vacated some part or all of an arbitral award on grounds
that the panel manifestly disregarded the law in four of forty-eight
73
applications.17 2 Adding the "significant injustice" requirement1

'
Wallace, 378 F.3d at 189.
172 Id. at 191 ("[It was calculated

that since 1960 [the second circuit has] vacated some
part or all of an arbitral award for manifest disregard in... four out of at least 48 cases ......
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should further bolster perception of the business community that the
overwhelming majority of arbitral awards will be confirmed. Hence,
the business community, to the extent it is seeking certainty and finality, should find arbitration to be a very attractive method to resolve
disputes.
Second, while fostering finality and certainty, the proposed
standard does maintain some role for a reviewing court (in addition,
to that provided by the FAA). 174 This role should serve the business
community's requirement for a dispute resolution process that, while
efficient and certain, also maintains some predictability. Predictability is important because it allows businesspeople to understand the
risk associated with the litigation, establish appropriate reserves, and
engage in an informed settlement discussion.

While they may be

willing to relinquish the right to a full appellate review process, the
business community may not be willing to include arbitration clauses
in their contracts if there is no constraint whatsoever on arbitral discretion, such as a lack of any predictability. The recommended standard provides such constraints while at the same time providing arbitrators with a very wide berth to resolve disputes.
Lastly, the recommended standard will encourage arbitral
panels to issue written decisions. Most arbitration clauses contained
in commercial contracts do not require arbitrators to issue written ar-

(citing Duferco, 333 F.3d at 389)).
173 Kergosien, 390 F.3d at 355. The court held that to vacate an award the arbitrators must
appreciate the applicable legal standard, but not apply it. Moreover, even when such disregard of the law is present, the award will not be vacated unless it would result in a significant
injustice. Id.
174See 9 U.S.C.A § 10(a) (West 2007) (providing four statutory grounds for vacatur of
awards upon a finding of the most egregious arbitral misconduct).
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bitration decisions. Allowing an intrusive search into the arbitrator's
evidentiary findings (as permitted in the Fourth Circuit)'75 and contract determinations (as Helmsley seemed to permit)' 76 would deter a
panel from executing a written award. Therefore, to encourage that
arbitrators continue to issue written awards (which enable a reviewing court to more readily preserve the efficacy of that award), it is essential that their findings of fact (evidentiary or contractual) are not
subject to review. In Misco, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of written arbitration awards to an effective enforcement/vacatur procedure and the chilling effect invasive fact review
would have on those writings. While the subject matter litigated in
Misco involved a collective bargaining dispute (not arising under the
FAA), the policies to avoid fact review are present in all arbitration:
to encourage written awards and allow a limited legal review to ensure the efficacy of the arbitral award while still preserving the policies that encourage commercial enterprises to arbitrate.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Alafabco,177 clarification of the criteria for review of arbitration awards is of imminent
importance to the business community. Moreover, because arbitration clauses are commonplace in business agreements, clarification of
Apex, 142 F.3d at 193. The Fourth Circuit permits vacatur upon a judicial finding that
the arbitration panel could not have rationally inferred its disposition in light of the applicable contract(s) and/or evidentiary record presented by the parties. Id.
176 Helmsley at Court of Appeals, 846 N.E.2d at 1210 (citing Westerbeke, 304 F.3d at
222).
177 Alafabco, 539 U.S. at 56 (holding that the FAA is coextensive with the Commerce
Clause applying to activity merely affecting commerce).
171
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the standard of review for vacatur is of even greater importance.
Given the underlying policies that encourage business entities to employ arbitration as an alternative to litigation, reviewing courts should
review with a presumption in favor of enforcement. However, such
courts ought to utilize the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine to ensure that the arbitration panel did in fact adhere to the legal principles
that govern the dispute. Thus, while the Supreme Court or legislature
must be charged with the final determination of how to strike this
balance, a hybrid of the Second Circuit standard bolstered by the
Fifth Circuit's "significant injustice" requirement would best serve
the policy underpinning arbitration, while allowing a limited role for
a reviewing court (a role that would ensure the efficacy of the arbitration panel's legal determinations).
In any case, Helmsley represents the culmination of fifty-three
years of confusion surrounding the Manifest Disregard of Law Doctrine.

That confusion manifested itself in the Helmsley litigation,

which is instructive to the adverse effect the current state of the doctrine has on the principles

underpinning arbitration.

Surely,

Helmsley-Spear and Wein & Malkin agreed to engage in arbitration
based on common expectations of that process-that it would effectuate a quick, certain, and final resolution to a complicated commercial dispute. However, as a result of the half-century of confusion
surrounding the doctrine, the parties to Helmsley were subject to a
protracted appellate process with a stop at the New York State Supreme Court, two trips to the New York State Appellate Division,
First Department (separated by a trip to the Supreme Court), and, fi-

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

43

Touro Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 [2014], Art. 7

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 24

nally, litigation at the New York Court of Appeals. Indeed, even the
parties to the dispute, who zealously believed in the merits of their
respective claims, eventually decided to settle the dispute rather than
continue the process. Certainly, if commercial arbitration is to remain viable, particularly in light of the doctrine's current applicability to both state and federal review of arbitral awards, legislative action or the Supreme Court must clarify the standards of review to
reinstate the policies underpinning arbitration. Of course, the business community is aware of the Helmsley case and one can be sure
they will want nothing to do with a process that might result in such a
protracted, uncertain, appellate nightmare.
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